6/5/2023 0 Comments Cosco tracking rotterdam![]() ![]() maritime cabotage law with land and air cabotage laws, can also chip away at the distortions that COSCO can inject into the common market in the status quo.ĬOSCO presents national and economic security risks not through a single investment in any European port, but because of three key factors.įirst, COSCO is not just another shipping company. Yet further changes, such as the way European anti-monopoly rules are applied, as well as aligning E.U. ![]() Furthermore, the European Union has other measures in the pipeline that can help, like the measure to regulate foreign subsidies that are inbound. Instead, an updated mechanism should be able to capture not only the “smoking gun” types of risks but also the “slow-burning” types that drive longer-term dependency risks in critical infrastructure and logistics. The mechanism still primarily captures sharp and immediate national security or public order risks, and even then its ruling is not binding. First would be further Europeanization of the European Union’s Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanism, which has been operational since 2020. ![]() That means understanding the nature of COSCO as a company that differs from its European competitors, the uneven playing field it benefits from, and the growing scale of its footprint in the common market - all of which generate long-term dependency risks.īeyond grasping the scale of the challenge, European policymakers have a range of options at their disposal. To manage this issue, European policymakers should first understand the manner in which COSCO is able to rapidly build market share in European ports and shipping services in a way that would be impossible going the other direction. ![]() Furthermore, this is the first major investment to take place after the establishment of an E.U.-level investment screening mechanism. Importantly, the decision also comes in the context of different times - not only has Beijing changed, but so have its ties with Moscow. The impacts on the common market stem from Berlin being only the most recent of a long trend of member state governments to allow China’s state-owned COSCO to exploit market advantages to capture market share in the European Union. After months of debate, the German government approved an amended investment which, if COSCO accepts the counteroffer, will lead to 24.9 percent ownership.Ībsent other factors, this decision does not present an immediate risk to German or European security, but when contextualized with broader trends, it adds to growing medium to long-term risks for Berlin, and for the European Union more broadly. Most recently, this involved China’s massive state-owned shipping company COSCO seeking a 35 percent share in the Tollerort Terminal at the Port of Hamburg. Europe may be rapidly adapting after the fact to Russia’s coercive use of its control over European critical infrastructure and the oil and natural gas that flow through it, but the opposite has happened regarding China’s increasing role in European ports and the shipping services that flow through them. While the discussion of these risks has advanced, the policy framework and how it is used to respond to such dependencies needs urgent change. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping has a track record of imposing economic coercion in response to slights against Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent weaponization of Europe’s energy dependency on Moscow has hit every corner of the continent’s economy. Europe is waking up to the dangers of overreliance on authoritarian powers, but largely lacks the toolkit necessary to mitigate dependencies on the very regimes most willing to exploit them. ![]()
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